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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The phrase “Tax Constitutional Questions” may seem to be an oxymoron 
or at least an interesting juxtaposition somewhat akin to the phrase “passive 
activity” derived from Section 469 of the Internal Revenue Code, which is 
familiar to tax practitioners, professors, and perhaps others.1  It has been 
noted elsewhere that it is seemingly normal that tax professors (and tax 
practitioners) are somewhat isolated from such weighty issues as 
                                                 
 * Honors A.B., Xavier University, J.D., Case Western Reserve University, LL.M. (Tax), University 
of Florida, C.P.A., California and Ohio, is a Professor of Accounting at California State University, San 
Bernardino.  Thank you to my wife, Tanya, who constantly inspires me, our dog Murphy, who constantly 
entertains me, and our sons Jonathan and Garrett, who constantly interest me.  Thank you also to Kathi 
Menard who has taken on the task, from the now retired Marion Wiltjer, of trying to decipher my dictation 
and handwriting. 
 1. I.R.C. § 469 (2012). 
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constitutional questions.2  Professor Erik Jensen has stated, “[T]hat issues of 
race, gender, and class have not been addressed very much by tax professors, 
who have instead ‘focused on more narrow and technical issues in business 
and financial taxation.’”3  Professor Jensen has also emphasized the “tax 
academy’s traditional insistence on connection with the real world of 
practice” and the often separation of tax and constitutional questions (“[b]ut 
raise one tax question with a con law person, and he’s gone . . . .”).4  
Despite what may be the tax bar’s seeming reluctance to engage in 
constitutional questions, those questions are nevertheless thrust upon tax 
practitioners and professors.  Perhaps nowhere has the intersection of 
taxation and constitutional law been clearer than in the recent United States 
Supreme Court case on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (hereinafter 
“NFIB”).5  In fact, Chief Justice Roberts’s five-four majority opinion upheld 
the so-called individual and employer mandate of the legislation, dubbed 
“Obamacare,” as a tax.6   Much has been and will undoubtedly be written 
about NFIB.  The attempt here will be to determine whether or not some of 
the other recent tax constitutional cases, particularly Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission,7 which might be used in a tax setting, shed 
any light on the constitutional decision making in NFIB.8  Once again, this 
task is approached from the perspective of the tax professor and practitioner 
rather than those in the field of constitutional law.  Indeed, in Citizens 
United, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, was relying heavily upon a 
tax constitutional case, despite not specifically citing to the case.9  In Citizens 
United, Justice Kennedy quotes Justice Scalia’s dissent in Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce writing, “It is rudimentary that the State cannot exact 
as the price of these special advantages [of the corporate form] the forfeiture 
                                                 
 2. John R. Dorocak, Same-Sex Couples and the Tax Law: Tax Filing Status for Lesbians and Others, 
33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 19, 20 at n.4 (2007) and accompanying text (citing Erik M. Jensen, Critical Theory 
and The Loneliness of The Tax Prof, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1753, 1766 & n.17 (1998)); see also John R. 
Dorocak, The Income Tax Exclusion of the Housing Allowance for Ministers of the Gospel per I.R.C. 
Section 107:  First Amendment Establishment of Religion or Free Exercise Thereof-Where Should the 
Warren Court Have Gone?, 54 S.D. L. REV. 233, 236 at n.10 (2009); John R. Dorocak, Recent 
Constitutional Questions in Taxation: Toward a Legislative Solution to Constitutional Problems of Same-
Sex Couples and Ministers of the Gospel?, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 223, 224 at n.2 (2009); 
John R. Dorocak & Lloyd E. Peake, Political Activity of Tax-Exempt Churches, Particularly After Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission and California’s Proposition 8 Ban on Same-Sex Marriage: 
Render Unto Caesar What is Caesar, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 448, 480 & n.152 (2010). 
 3. Jensen, supra note 2, at n.17 and accompanying text (citing Edward McCaffery, Statement at 
Taxation and the Family Conference at Lewis and Clark Northwestern School of Law (Oct. 6, 1995) 
(quoted in Rebecca S. Rudnick, Taxation and the Family, 69 TAX NOTES 421, 421 (1995)).  
 4. Id. at 1753, 1756. 
 5. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (hereinafter “NFIB”).  
 6. Id. at 2608.  
 7. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
 8. See generally Dorocak & Peake, supra note 2.  
 9. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905 (1990) (quoting Austin v. Mich. 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
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of the First Amendment rights.”10  The tax constitutional case citation that 
Justice Kennedy omitted from Justice Scalia’s quote was Speiser v. 
Randall.11  
The inquiry here is whether or not Speiser’s prohibition of the 
nonexercise of a constitutional right as a condition for a tax benefit might 
also apply to, or at least inform, the constitutional decision making in NFIB.  
This article will first review the reasoning concerning the use of the taxing 
power to sustain legislation before the court in both the majority and 
dissenting opinions in NFIB.  Second, this article will discuss the cases of 
Speiser and Citizens United within the context of tax constitutional cases.  
Third, this article will discuss whether Speiser and Citizens United might 
apply to or inform the decision making in NFIB.  Fourth, this article will 
discuss similarities and differences in the use of Speiser, in context of matters 
to which Citizens United would apply in the tax area and the context of 
NFIB.  Finally, the last section of this article will extend to the broader areas 
of constitutionalism in an effort to understand NFIB in the light of Speiser.  
That is, the constitution as a charter of negative or positive liberties will be 
discussed.  
 
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO TAX IN NATIONAL FEDERATION OF 
INDEPENDENT BUSINESS 
 
In NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the five-four majority of the 
Court, upheld a provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
the so-called individual mandate to purchase health insurance or to make a 
payment to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), as an exercise of the taxing 
power to “lay and correct Taxes,” as established in Article 1, Section 8, 
Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution.12  In closing, the portion of the Court’s 
opinion upholding the individual mandate as a tax, Chief Justice Roberts’ 
states, “The Affordable Care Act’s requirement that certain individuals pay a 
financial penalty for not obtaining health insurance may reasonably be 
characterized as a tax.  Because the Constitution permits such a tax, it is not 
our role to forbid it, or pass upon its wisdom or fairness.”13 
Chief Justice Roberts’s first reason—that the individual mandate’s 
“shared responsibility payment” is a tax—is because “it looks like a tax” for 
multiple reasons.14  First, the payment is made to the Treasury by taxpayers 
                                                 
 10. Id. at 905.  
 11. Austin, 494 U.S. at 680.  
 12. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. at 2594. 
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when they file their tax return and does not apply to individuals who do not 
pay federal income taxes because their income is below the filing threshold.15  
Second, the amount to be paid is determined by factors such as income, 
number of dependents, and joint filing status.16  Third, the amount to be paid 
is enforced by the IRS in the same manner as taxes.17  Fourth, the payments 
produce revenue, estimated to be about $4 billion by 2017.18 
In addition, Chief Justice Roberts states that the Court has, in several 
previous cases, held that the label Congress uses, tax or penalty, does not 
control for constitutional purposes.19  Chief Justice Roberts cites Bailey v. 
Drexel Furniture, License Tax Cases, and New York v. United States to 
support the assertion that the Congressional label is not controlling for 
constitutional purposes.20  He then applied the three-part reasoning used in 
Drexel Furniture to conclude that the fee in the case at hand was a tax.  First, 
Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that the required payment would be far less 
than the price of insurance, and it would be a reasonable financial decision to 
make the payment unlike the “prohibitory” payment required in Drexel 
Furniture.21  Second, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that the individual 
mandate had no scienter requirement, the requirement typical of punitive 
statutes requiring that the act be done knowingly.22  Third, the Chief Justice 
reasoned that the payment was collected by the IRS, the normal agency for 
collecting taxation, rather than another agency.23 
Further, Chief Justice Roberts compared the payments under the 
Affordable Care Act to the payment required in New York, in which a state 
responsible for providing for disposal of low-level radioactive waste was 
exposed to a surcharge if it shipped such waste to another state.24  Chief 
Justice Roberts stated that the Court had interpreted the statute in New York 
as a tax imposing “a series of incentives” encouraging a statute to take 
responsibility for its nuclear waste.25  Chief Justice Roberts stated that a 
“similar approach” would apply in NFIB.26  
Chief Justice Roberts indicated that there were three considerations 
limiting the extent of imposing a tax for “not doing something.”27  First, he 
reasoned that Congress already had exercised its taxing power to encourage 
                                                 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 2595 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 
259 U.S. 20 (1922); License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462 (1867)).  
 21. Id. at 2595–96.  
 22. Id. at 2596. 
 23. Id. 
 24. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2597. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 2599.  
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activity such as purchasing homes and professional education so that 
upholding the mandate of the purchase of health insurance “does not 
recognize any new federal power.”28  Second, the Chief Justice reasoned that 
the taxing power was limited in that a measure such as the shared 
responsibility payment must “pass muster as a tax under our narrower 
interpretation” and that there also was a “point at which an exaction becomes 
so punitive that the taxing power does not authorize it.”29  Writing for the 
majority, the Chief Justice held that the shared responsibility payment met 
the three-part test of what was a tax under Drexel Furniture.30  Third, the 
Chief Justice stated that the power to tax, although broader than the power to 
regulate commerce, “does not give Congress the same degree of control over 
individual behavior” because “Congress’s authority under the taxing power is 
limited to requiring an individual to pay money into the Federal Treasury, no 
more.”31 
The joint dissent, with whom Chief Justice Roberts agreed on the holding 
that the individual mandate could not be constitutionally sustained as an 
exercise of the commerce clause,32 would have also held that the individual 
mandate could not be constitutionally justified as an exercise of the taxing 
power.33  In its analysis that the commerce clause could not be used to 
constitutionally justify the individual mandate, the joint dissent suggested 
that “there are many ways other than this unprecedented Individual Mandate 
by which the regulatory scheme’s goals of reducing insurance premiums and 
ensuring the profitability of insurers could be achieved.”34  The dissent then 
advised that those who did not purchase the insurance could be surcharged 
when they entered the health care system or those individuals could be 
denied a full income tax credit given to others who purchased insurance.35  
The dissent stated that “[t]he issue is not whether Congress had the power to 
frame the minimum-coverage provision as a tax, but whether it did so.”36  
In a lengthy decision of the Court involving several opinions, the joint 
dissent devotes just a few pages to its reasoning that the individual mandate 
was not sustainable as an exercise of the taxing power.37  The joint dissent 
states that Congress did not exercise the taxing power and the dissenters 
                                                 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2599. 
 31. Id. at 2600. 
 32. Id. at 2593. 
 33. Id. at 2655 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., and Alito, J., dissenting). 
 34. Id. at 2647. 
 35. Id.  
 36. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2651.  
 37. Id.at 2650–55. 
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refused to rewrite the statute to exercise that power.38  The joint dissenters 
explained their reasoning as follows:  
 
Our cases establish a clear line between a tax and a 
penalty . . . .  In a few cases, this Court has held that a “tax” 
imposed upon private conduct was so onerous as to be in 
effect a penalty. But we have never held—never—that a 
penalty imposed for violation of the law was so trivial as to 
be in effect a tax.39 
 
The dissent found that the individual mandate in Section 5000A of the 
Internal Revenue Code imposed a penalty for failure to meet a requirement 
and that the congressional legislative findings with regard to the section 
“confirm that it sets forth a legal requirement and constitutes the assertion of 
regulatory power, not mere taxing power.”40  In addition, the dissent stated, 
“We never have classified as a tax an exaction imposed for violation of the 
law, and so too, we never have classified as a tax an exaction described in the 
legislation itself as a penalty.”41  Further, the dissent pointed out that there 
were two classes of those exempt from Section 5000A:  those exempt from 
the mandate because such persons were not “an applicable individual”—
those with religious objections, not lawfully present in the U.S., or 
incarcerated—and those exempt from the payment liability—those who 
could not afford coverage, earned too little income, or members of an Indian 
tribe, who have short gaps in coverage, and who have suffered hardship in 
the judgment of the Secretary of Health and Human Services.42 The dissent 
stated that if the payment were a tax, there would be only one category of 
exemptions; i.e., those exempt from the tax.43  
Additionally, the dissent also indicated that the Court had found the IRS 
could collect a penalty, but that, where other agencies were involved, this 
was “a feature that would be quite extraordinary for taxes.”44  Finally, the 
dissent stated, “And the nail in the coffin is that the mandate and penalty are 
located in Title I of the Act, its operative core, rather than where a tax would 
be found – in Title IX, containing the Act’s ‘Revenue Provisions.’”45  The 
dissent added: 
 
                                                 
 38. Id. at 2651. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 2652. 
 41. Id. at 2653. 
 42. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2653. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at 2654. 
 45. Id. at 2655. 
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We have no doubt that Congress knew precisely what it was 
doing when it rejected an earlier version of this legislation 
that imposed a tax instead of a requirement-with-penalty 
. . . .  Imposing a tax through judicial legislation inverts the 
constitutional scheme, and places the power to tax in the 
branch of government least accountable to the citizenry.46  
 
In closing, the dissent observed that “rewriting § 5000A as a tax in order 
to sustain its constitutionality would force us to confront a difficult 
constitutional question: whether this is a direct tax . . . [N]o federal court has 
accepted the implausible argument that § 5000A is an exercise of the taxing 
power.”47  
 
III.  SPEISER V. RANDALL AND CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC:  CONDITIONING A 
BENEFIT ON THE NONEXERCISE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
 
In NFIB, the five-four majority and the dissent reach opposite 
conclusions on the issue of whether the required payment of the individual 
mandate in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is a 
constitutionally permissible tax.48  In light of the division in the court, 
perhaps precedents of the Court other than those examined by the majority 
and the dissent might assist in resolving the constitutional question of 
whether the required payment is a constitutional exercise of the taxing 
power.  The suggestion here is to look to a recent precedent of the Court, 
Citizens United, and related cases.49  Although the much analyzed and often 
criticized doctrine of constitutional conditions might be said to be involved, 
the suggestion is to examine the recent case in possibly a new light.50  
In Speiser, Justice Brennan famously wrote, “[W]e hold that when the 
constitutional right to speak is sought to be deterred by a State’s general 
taxing program due process demands that the speech be unencumbered until 
the State comes forward with sufficient proof to justify its inhibition.”51  
Justice Brennan added, “Similarly it does not follow that because only a tax 
liability is here involved, the ordinary tax assessment procedures are 
                                                 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  
 48. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566. 
 49. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (1990). 
 50. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein Judicial Engagement With the Affordable Care Act: Why Rational 
Basis Analysis Falls Short, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 931, 933–34 (2012) (lamenting the decline of the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions); Note, What The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Can Teach 
Us About ERISA Preemption: Is It Possible to Consistently Identify “Coercive” Pay-or-Play Schemes?, 
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1482 (2009) (citing much of the existing scholarship). 
 51. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528–29 (1958). 
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adequate when applied to penalized speech.”52  In Speiser, the taxpayer was 
required to take a loyalty oath to obtain a property tax exemption available to 
veterans. 
Justice Scalia, when utilizing Speiser in his dissent in Austin, stated 
perhaps more directly, “It is rudimentary that the State cannot exact the price 
of those special advantages the forfeiture of First Amendment rights.”53  
Justice Scalia had “[t]axbreaks” listed among the “all sorts of special 
advantages that the State need not confer.”54   Scalia’s dissent in Austin 
became the basis of the majority opinion in Citizens United, in which Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the majority, overruled Austin and adopted, by citation 
and quotation, Scalia’s dissenting language in Austin, although not Scalia’s 
citation to Speiser.55  
Plainly, Speiser and Citizens United involved the First Amendment right 
of free speech and it was in that context that the Justices of the Supreme 
Court stated that a tax benefit could not be conditioned upon the non-exercise 
of a constitutional right.  But perhaps that principal has a broader application.  
In Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington,56 Justice 
Blackmun, in the concurring opinion joined by Justices Brennan and 
Marshall, placed Speiser in a wider context: 
 
If viewed in isolation, the lobbying restriction contained 
in § 501(c)(3) violates the principal, reaffirmed today, “that 
the government may not deny a benefit to a person because 
he exercises a constitutional right.”  Section 501(c)(3) does 
not merely deny a subsidy for lobbying activities; it deprives 
an otherwise eligible organization of its tax-exempt status 
. . . for all its activities[.]57 
 
The majority opinion in Regan, perhaps more forcefully than in Speiser, 
stated that “TWR is certainly correct when it states that we have held that the 
government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a 
constitutional right.”58 
                                                 
 52. Id. at 525. 
 53. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)).  
 54. Id. 
 55. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905 (2010); Dorocak & Peake, supra 
note 2, 469 at n.102 and accompanying text.   
 56. 461 U.S. 540, 552 (1997). 
 57. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 552 (1997) (citing Speiser, 357 
U.S. at 518–519) (citations omitted); Dorocak & Peake, supra note 2, at n.41 and accompanying text.  
Justice Brennan appears to be stating the difference in The Constitutional Conditions doctrine of denying a 
subsidy versus imposing a penalty.  See Note, supra note 50, at 1511. 
 58. Regan, 461 U.S. at 545. 
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The Regan majority cited yet another case, Perry v. Sindermann, in 
which Justice Steward was likely even more direct in stating the principle. 
 
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear 
that even though a person has no “right” to a valuable 
governmental benefit and even though the government may 
deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are 
some reasons upon which the government may not rely.  It 
may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes 
his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest 
in freedom of speech.  For if the government could deny a 
benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected 
speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would 
in effect be penalized and inhibited.  This would allow the 
government to “produce a result which [it] could not 
command directly.”  Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526.  
Such interference with constitutional rights is 
impermissible.59 
 
IV.  DO SPEISER AND CITIZENS UNITED AID IN UNDERSTANDING NATIONAL 
FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS? 
 
A.  Liberty as the Non-Exercised or Burdened Constitutional Right 
 
Thus the Supreme Court has acknowledged, apparently frequently, that a 
benefit, including a tax benefit, may not be conditioned on the non-exercise 
of a constitutional right, or, in other words, that the constitutional right may 
not be burdened.  Applying this reasoning in NFIB would likely immediately 
raise the question of what constitutional right was burdened or not exercised 
in order to obtain the tax benefit of not being forced to make the required 
payment of the individual mandate.  Perhaps the constitutional right, which is 
not exercised or is burdened, might be found in an examination of the key 
difference between the majority opinion and the dissent, at least in terms of 
examples about taxes. 
Chief Justice Roberts, in the majority opinion, cites the following 
example: 
  
Suppose Congress enacted a statute providing that every 
taxpayer who owns a house without energy efficient 
                                                 
 59. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).  
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windows must pay $50 to the IRS.  The amount due is 
adjusted based on factors such as taxable income and joint 
filing status, and is paid along with the taxpayer’s income 
tax return.  Those whose income is below the filing threshold 
need not pay.  The required payment is not called a “tax,” a 
“penalty,” or anything else.  No one would doubt that this 
law imposed a tax, and was within Congress’ power to tax.60 
 
On the other hand, the dissenters clearly did not believe Chief Justice 
Roberts’ example was a tax.  The dissenters’ examples differed: 
  
With the present statute, by contrast, there are many 
ways other than this unprecedented Individual Mandate by 
which the regulatory scheme’s goals of reducing insurance 
premiums and ensuring the profitability of insurers could be 
achieved.  For instance, those who did not purchase 
insurance could be subjected to a surcharge when they do 
enter the health insurance system.  Or they could be denied a 
full income tax credit given to those who do purchase the 
insurance.61 
 
Clearly the dissent’s two examples highlight the dissenters’ refusal to extend 
the commerce clause to inactivity and the taxing power to a penalty.  
The dissent, in its examples, was concerned about the extent of federal 
government power and the protection of individual constitutional rights.  
 
The Government was invited, at oral argument, to 
suggest what federal controls over private conduct (other 
than those explicitly prohibited by the Bill of Rights or other 
constitutional controls) could not be justified as necessary 
and proper for carrying out of a general regulatory scheme.  
It was unable to name any . . . .  [T]he proposition that the 
Federal Government cannot do everything is a fundament 
precept.62 
 
Thus, given these tax examples of the majority opinion and the dissent, 
and the dissent’s reference to private conduct, the question of what 
constitutional rights are not exercised to avoid the required payment under 
the individual mandate is again raised.  Or, in other words, what 
constitutional right is burdened by that payment?   
                                                 
 60. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2597–98 (2012).  
 61. Id. at 2647. 
 62. Id. (citation omitted). 
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The first answer that may occur to outsiders—such as tax practitioners, 
tax professors, possibly constitution scholars, those on the court, those in 
academia and others—is that liberty is what is protected.  However, 
protecting liberty under current constitutional jurisprudence may not be such 
an easy matter.  In criticizing the current jurisprudence, which protects 
liberty under the due process clause, Professor Randy Barnett has said the 
following: 
 
There are two different formulations of what makes a liberty 
fundamental, and sometimes courts run them both together: 
those rights that are “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty” and those rights that are “deeply rooted in the 
nation’s tradition and history.”  
 
. . . .  
 
The fact that courts can come out any way they want, 
depending on which of the accurate characterizations of the 
liberty they choose shows that there is something seriously 
wrong with current doctrine.63 
 
This difficulty in protecting liberty apparently exists despite the 
statement in the Preamble to the Constitution that it was drafted to “secure 
the Blessing of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity . . .”64 and the famous 
wording of the Declaration of Independence, “[T]hat all men . . . are 
endowed, by their Creator, with certain unalienable rights; that among these 
are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness . . . .”65  
Without using the term “liberty” itself, Justice Scalia still wrote 
forcefully for the dissent in NFIB as follows:  
 
What is absolutely clear, affirmed by the text of the 1789 
Constitution, by the Tenth Amendment ratified in 1791, and 
by innumerable cases of ours in the 220 years since, is that 
there are structural limits upon federal power—upon what it 
can prescribe with respect to private conduct, and upon what 
it can impose upon the sovereign States.  Whatever may be 
                                                 
 63. Randy E. Barnett, Access to Justice: The Social Responsibility of Lawyers: The Presumption of 
Liberty and the Public Interest: Medical Marijuana and Fundamental Rights, 22 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y. 
29, 41, 43 (2006) [hereinafter The Presumption of Liberty].  
 64. U.S. CONST. Pmbl.  
 65. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  
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the conceptual limits upon the Commerce Clause and upon 
the power to tax and spend, they cannot be such as will 
enable the Federal Government to regulate all private 
conduct and to compel the States to function as 
administrators of federal programs.66 
 
However, whether the formulation is that the federal government has 
limited powers, or that individuals have liberty, is this argument not the 
same?  Professor Barnett counseled that the limited powers argument could 
more easily find a receptive audience, particularly on the Court, stating. “I 
think there may be five votes for the proposition that economic mandates are 
simply not within the limited and enumerated powers of Congress.”67  
 
B.   Supreme Court Precedents on Liberty—Griswold v. Connecticut, 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, Roe v. Wade, Lawrence v. Texas 
 
Likely, anyone even slightly familiar with the Supreme Court’s 
protection of liberty under the due process clause would turn to cases such as 
Griswold v. Connecticut,68 Eisenstadt v. Baird,69 Roe v. Wade,70 and 
Lawrence v. Texas,71 as does Professor Barnett. 
 
While there is no need to memorize the lost Ninth 
Amendment, law students really should memorize Footnote 
Four [United States v. Carolene Products] because, to some 
degree, this Footnote became the sole constitutional 
protection of liberty.  In the body of the opinion in Carolene 
Products, the court adopts a “presumption of 
constitutionality” that attaches to any legislation—especially 
that which purports to regulate the economy.  Footnote Four 
then qualifies the text by asserting that there is a narrower 
scope for the operation of the presumption of 
constitutionality when the laws affect the rights or specific 
prohibitions of the Constitution—including portions of the 
Bill of Rights.  
 
 . . . .  
                                                 
 66. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2643 (2012).  
 67. Brad Joondeph et al., Our Pending National Debate: Is Health Care Reform Constitutional?, 62 
MERCER L. REV. 605, 617 (2011).  
 68. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see John R. Dorocak, Same-Sex Couples and the Tax Law: Tax Filing Status 
for Lesbians and Others, 33 OHIO N. UNIV. L. REV. 19, 29–31 (2007). 
 69. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).   
 70. 410 U.S. 438 (1973).   
 71. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 




In the 1960s, when an unenumerated “right of privacy,” 
which is not an “express prohibition” in the Constitution, 
was protected by the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, all 
hell broke loose, even among those progressives who 
rejected the legal prohibition of contraceptives.72      
 
There is certainly language suggesting constitutional protection of liberty 
in Griswold v. Connecticut,73 the case where the Supreme Court invalidated a 
Connecticut statute criminalizing use and distribution of contraceptives as 
unconstitutional for violating a fundamental privacy right.  In Griswold, the 
nine justices unanimously joined in Justice Douglas’s opinion of the Court.  
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan also joined in Justice Goldberg’s 
concurring opinion, which stated that: 
 
The protection guaranteed by the (Fourth and Fifth) amendments 
is much broader in scope.  The makers of our Constitution 
undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of 
happiness . . . .  They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure 
and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things . . . . 
They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let 
alone–the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men.74 
 
Justice Goldberg quoted the Ninth Amendment75 in his opinion, clearly 
believing that it applied in Griswold.  He also quoted the Tenth 
Amendment,76 James Madison,77 Alexander Hamilton,78 Justice Story,79 and 
Bates v. Little Rock: 
 
In a long series of cases this Court has held that where 
fundamental liberties are involved, they may not be abridged by 
the States simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some 
rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose.  
                                                 
 72. Presumption of Liberty, supra note 63, at 40. 
 73. 381 U.S. 479. 
 74. Id. at 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).  
 75. Id. at 488. 
 76. Id. at 489 n.4. 
 77. Id. at 489–90. 
 78. Id. at 489 n.4. 
 79. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 490 (quoting COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 626–27 (5th ed. 1891)). 
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“Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal 
liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating 
interest which is compelling.”80 
 
The Ninth Amendment provides, “The enumeration in the Constitution, 
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained 
by the people.”81  The Tenth Amendment provides, “[t]he powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”82  Justice 
Goldberg concluded, “[the] statements of Madison and Story make clear that 
the Framers did not intend that the first eight amendments be construed to 
exhaust the basic and fundamental rights which the Constitution guaranteed 
to the people.”83  Justice Goldberg was aware that “[t]his [Ninth] 
Amendment has been referred to as ‘The Forgotten Ninth Amendment,’ in a 
book with that title by Bennett B. Patterson (1955).”84  Long after Griswold, 
Professor Barnett also admitted that he had made a cottage industry out of his 
attention to clauses seemingly lost from constitution, such as the Ninth 
Amendment.85 
Lawrence v. Texas,86 finding a Texas statute criminalizing same sex 
sodomy unconstitutional, also offers some promising generalities about 
protected liberties.87  In Lawrence, the Court noted that “[i]f the right of 
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to 
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
                                                 
 80. Id. at 497 (quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (Goldberg, J., concurring)).  
 81. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.  
 82. U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
 83. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 490 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 84. Id. at 492 n.6.  
 85. Presumption of Liberty, supra note 63, at 31.  Professor Barnett writes:  
[S]ince 1988 I have been writing and thinking about the Ninth Amendment to the 
Constitution, which says “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not 
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”  I have to tell you what 
it says because I have a suspicion that it may not be strongly emphasized in your 
constitutional law classes.  If you did not study the Ninth Amendment it is because the 
Supreme Court has basically ignored it for most of its history, along with a number of 
other clauses I discuss in my book, Restoring the Lost Constitution.  The term “lost 
constitution” in the title of my book refers to these clauses, like the Ninth Amendment, 
that are read out of the Constitution and just aren’t there anymore as a practical matter.  
No lawyer could litigate on the basis of the Ninth Amendment or using the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  These clauses are effectively redacted 
from the text.  Still, I started writing about the Ninth Amendment because it always 
seemed like an interesting clause, and one that appealed to me ever since I was a law 
student.  I figured, “Well, now I had tenure,” so I should be able to write about any clause 
that was still literally in the Constitution, even if it was considered to be beyond the pale 
by scholars. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 86. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding unconstitutional a Texas statute that criminalized sodomy between 
same-sex couples). 
 87. Id. at 578–79. 
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fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child.”88  In addition, the Lawrence Court quoted from Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey that “[o]ur obligation is to define the 
liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”89  The Lawrence Court 
went on to explain that “[t]he Casey decision again confirmed that our laws 
and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and 
education.”90  In further explanation, the Lawrence Court quoted the Casey 
Court once again:  
 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices 
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal 
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  At the heart of liberty is the right to 
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life.  Beliefs about these 
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they 
formed under compulsion of the State.91 
 
The Casey Court, which revisited Roe v. Wade some 20 years after its 
decision that certain restrictions on abortion were unconstitutional, held that 
the requirement that a woman notify her husband before an abortion was 
similarly unconstitutional and further stated: 
 
It is conventional constitutional doctrine that where 
reasonable people disagree the government can adopt one 
position or the other.  That theorem, however, assumes a state of 
affairs in which the choice does not intrude upon a protected 
liberty.  Thus, while some people might disagree about whether 
or not the flag should be saluted, or disagree about the 
proposition that it may not be defiled, we have ruled that a State 
may not compel or enforce one view or the other.92 
 
What might be said about all of these Supreme Court quotes about 
liberty, in the context of the decision to uphold the individual mandate of 
Obamacare, may best be captured by that which comedian Woody Allen is 
                                                 
 88. Id. at 565 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).  
 89. Id. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)). 
 90. Id. at 573–74 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).  
 91. Id. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
 92. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (internal citations omitted). 
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reported to have said about baseball: “it doesn’t have to mean anything, it’s 
just very beautiful . . . .”93  Quoting Mr. Allen may seem a bit harsh, but the 
majority opinion in NFIB does not seem to recognize a constitutional liberty 
interest either to be left alone or to make private personal decisions freely.  
The language of the Supreme Court in decisions past raises an important 
question. Why should decisions regarding contraception, appropriate types of 
sexual conduct, private schooling, and saluting or defiling the flag enjoy 
more protection than a decision about whether or not to purchase health 
insurance? After all, such a decision is both economic and deeply personal, 
affecting one’s right to conduct his or her own life and possibly its ending.  
 
C.   Constitutional Decision Making:  Presumption of Liberty Versus 
Presumption of Constitutionality 
 
Professor Barnett has indicated that the Supreme Court’s formulation 
requiring the finding of a fundamental right, implicit in ordered liberty or in 
the history and traditions of the nation, can offer limited protection of liberty. 
This is particularly true when the presumption is that federal or state 
legislation is constitutional, as opposed to the presumption of liberty on 
behalf of citizens.94  Professor Barnett explained the current state of 
constitutional law after Carolene Products, the presumption of 
constitutionality of legislation, Griswold, and the unenumerated right of 
privacy as follows: 
 
So the burden is now on the claimant litigating a Due 
Process Clause challenge to say that an unenumerated liberty is 
not just a mere “liberty interest,” which gets no judicial 
protection, but is one of these heightened “fundamental rights” 
that is either deeply rooted in the nation’s tradition and history or 
is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty . . . .  [B]ut see 
Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Court did protect liberty without 
finding, as a threshold matter, that the liberty in question was 
deeply rooted in the nation’s tradition and history.95 
 
Professor Barnett does have a suggestion: 
 
My proposal is that all liberties should be treated equally.  
Under my proposal, the government would have the burden to 
                                                 
 93. Mr. Allen’s actual quote was, “I love baseball, you know it doesn’t have to mean anything, it’s just 
very beautiful to watch.”  See PETER H. GORDON, DIAMONDS ARE FOREVER:  ARTISTS AND WRITERS ON 
BASEBALL (Chronicle Books 1987) (citing the ZELIG (ORION PICTURES 1983)).    
 94. See generally Presumption of Liberty, supra note 63 (discussing the presumption of liberty versus 
the presumption of constitutionality); see also Epstein, supra note 50, at 931. 
 95. Presumption of Liberty, supra note 63, at 41.  
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justify its restrictions on liberty, whether exercising its police 
power at the state level, or its enumerated powers at the federal 
level.  Whatever power is being exercised, the government may 
justly (1) regulate the rightful exercise of liberty or (2) prohibit 
wrongful acts, but they may not (3) prohibit rightful exercise of 
liberty.96 
 
Professor Barnett refers to the police power of the states in conjunction 
with the enumerated powers of the federal government. Many may well 
regard the federal government’s requirement that individuals purchase health 
insurance, or pay a “tax,” as akin to the states’ power to require motorcycle 
riders to wear a helmet.97  Of course, the federal government is supposed to 
be one of limited and enumerated powers, so much so that Professor Barnett 
thought that argument would prevail in NFIB:  “I think there may well be 
five votes for the proposition that economic mandates are simply not within 
the limited and enumerated powers of Congress.”98  And, of course, Justice 
Scalia emphasized that “there are structural limits upon federal power” and 
that the Constitution “enumerates not federally soluble problems, but 
federally available powers.”99  
Professor Barnett is concerned about the apparent lack of protection for 
liberty under current constitutional doctrine:  “Distinguishing ‘fundamental 
rights’ from mere ‘liberty interests’ and protecting only the former is bad for 
liberty, bad for the public interest, and something that courts are not 
particularly qualified or authorized to do.”100  Professor Barnett has 
apparently been alternately hopeful and not so hopeful about protection for 
liberty becoming greater.  
 
For the Constitution says this:  “The enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.”  And the Footnote Four 
formulation, even if expanded to include those unenumerated 
rights that courts deem to be “fundamental,” is a direct violation 
of this expressed conjunction of the Constitution itself.  Or so 
those academics with tenure may contend.  Perhaps someday, 
                                                 
 96. Id. at 43.  
 97. See, e.g., City of Bremerton v. Spears, 134 Wn.2d 141 (1998) (considering the constitutionality of a 
mandatory helmet law).  
 98. Joondeph, supra note 68, at 617 (article of Professor Randy Barnett).  
 99. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2643, 2650.  
 100. Presumption of Liberty, supra note 63, at 44.  
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Article III judges with lifetime tenure will agree.  Such a change 
of heart would be, I maintain, in the public interest.101  
 
Perhaps Article III judges searching for a way to afford additional 
protection to liberty might utilize cases such as Speiser and Citizens United 
as suggested above.  Indeed, the formulation in those cases is that a benefit 
may not be conditioned on the nonexercise of a constitutional right.102  
Applying that type of reasoning to Obamacare as addressed in NFIB, the 
Court could find that the benefit of not having to pay the tax of the individual 
mandate might well be conditioned upon the nonexercise of a constitutional 
right.  The constitutional  right not exercised would be an unenumerated 
liberty right in the Constitution to be left alone, as suggested in Griswold, 
and/or to make decisions about one’s personal affairs, as suggested in 
Casey.103 
Of course, in Speiser and Citizens United, the constitutional right that 
was not exercised or burdened was free speech under the First Amendment.  
Professor Barnett also utilizes the First Amendment cases, although 
admittedly reaching them by a different route. 
 
Consider how we now approach the liberties protected by the 
First Amendment—the rights of freedom of speech, press, and 
assembly.  When it comes to these liberties we allow them to be 
reasonably regulated by so-called time, place, and manner 
regulations . . . .  Therefore, the reasonable regulation of these 
liberties is constitutionally permissible, provided that the 
government is not improperly placing an undue burden on the 
exercise of liberty or discriminating against one viewpoint in 
favor of another. 
 
. . . .  
 
Just as the government now prohibits wrongful speech and 
regulates rightful speech, I propose simply that we take that 
same approach across the board with all liberties.  No longer 
would we protect only those liberties that are somehow 
“fundamental.”104 
 
Professor Barnett’s language of “not improperly placing undue burden on the 
exercise of liberty” may remind one of the “undue burden” language used in 
                                                 
 101. Id. at 44–45 (footnote omitted). 
 102. See supra notes 48–59 and accompanying text.  
 103. See supra notes 60–92 and accompanying text.  
 104. Presumption of Liberty, supra note 63, at 44.  
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Casey, when the Supreme Court revisited Roe v. Wade some twenty years 
later. 
In fact, there are pending challenges to Obamacare based on arguments 
under current constitutional interpretations. Such challenges would be that 
fundamental rights have suffered an undue burden so that the government 
must show a compelling interest for the legislation (as stated in Justice 
Goldberg’s concurring opinion in Griswold).105  For example, Liberty 
University v. Geithner106 has made an argument that the fundamental right of 
freedom of religion under the First Amendment is burdened by Obamacare. 
Professor Barnett has also attempted to use what he calls “anti-
commandeering” to similarly preserve liberty.107  Professor Barnett has 
reasoned to the anti-commandeering principle from Justice Scalia’s opinion 
in Printz v. United States.108  “In Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court 
held that this mandate [requiring local sheriffs to run background checks on 
the purchasers of firearms] on state executives unconstitutionally violated the 
Tenth Amendment and the sovereignty of state governments.” 109  Professor 
Barnett also compared that commandeering of the state governments to the 
commandeering of individuals.  “Just as commandeering state governments 
is an unconstitutional infringement of state sovereignty, commandeering the 
people violates the even more fundamental principle of popular 
sovereignty.”110 
Finally, Professor Barnett closes his anti-commandeering argument by 
stating that to allow such commandeering would turn citizens into subjects.  
 
The anti-commandeering principle precisely identifies why 
the individual mandate has so riled the American people.  
Ordinarily, persons are responsible for their failure to act—or 
omissions—when they have a preexisting duty to act.  A 
mandate to act, therefore, presupposes the existence of a duty.  
But unlike the type of preexisting fundamental duties that have 
                                                 
 105. See supra notes 72–80 and accompanying text.  
 106. See 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010), vacated, No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. Sept. 
8, 2011); see also Mark Sherman, Supreme Court Orders Federal Appeals Court to Consider Health Care 
Challenge, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 26, 2012, 1:04 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/26/supreme-court-health-care_n_2191463.html (discussing 
Liberty). 
 107. See generally Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance 
Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581 (2010) [hereinafter Commandeering the 
People] (arguing that the anti-commandeering doctrine ought to extend not only to states but also to 
individuals); see also Joondeph, supra note 68, at 617. 
 108. See 521 U.S. 898, 904–05 (1997) (commandeering of local law enforcement officers); see also 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (commandeering of state legislature). 
 109. Joondeph, supra note 68, at 616 (article of Professor Randy Barnett) (footnotes omitted). 
 110. Id. at 617.  
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traditionally been recognized, such as the duties to defend one’s 
country and provide the revenue needed to maintain its 
governance, there is no fundamental duty of citizenship to enter 
into contracts with private parties when Congress deems it 
convenient to the regulation of interstate commerce.  Upholding 
such mandates would truly turn citizens into subjects.111 
 
One may wonder why it has come to this seemingly difficult task to 
protect liberty in a society whose foundational documents, the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution, found liberty to be so essential.112  After 
all, at the risk of seeming facetious, noted American patriot Patrick Henry 
did not proclaim, “Give me health insurance or give me death!”113 
The next section of this paper considers the current dilemma of 
protecting liberty by seeking to understand, at least to some degree, the 
constitutional philosophy of the president whose name is immortalized in 
Obamacare, the term utilized to refer to the law under scrutiny in NFIB.  
 
V.  THE CONSTITUTION AS A CHARTER OF NEGATIVE LIBERTIES 
 
Perhaps it would be instructive in seeking to further the protection of 
liberty under constitutional doctrine to examine at least two currently 
prevalent doctrines of constitutionalism.  It is likely that many Americans 
first heard of negative constitutionalism and the U.S. Constitution described 
as a “charter of negative liberties” when a 2001 radio interview with Barack 
Obama was unearthed during the 2008 presidential campaign.  Back on 
January 18, 2001, State Senator Barack Obama appeared on WBEZ-FM’s 
show “Odyssey” to discuss the topic “The Courts and Civil Rights.”  When 
State Senator Obama described the U.S. Constitution as a “charter of 
negative liberties,” he was criticizing the Warren Court, usually regarded as 
quite liberal, for not being radical enough. 
He stated: 
 
But . . . the Supreme Court never ventured into the issues of 
redistribution of wealth and sort of more basic issues of political 
and economic justice in this society.  And to that extent, as 
                                                 
 111. Commandeering the People, supra note 107, at 637. 
 112. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.  
 113. See WILLIAM WIRT, SKETCHES OF THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF PATRICK HENRY 94 (1817) 
(quoting Patrick Henry, Speech at the House of Burgesses at St. John’s Church in Richmond, Virginia 
(Mar. 23, 1775) (transcript available at http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Patrick_Henry)).  The crowd, by 
Wirt's account, jumped up and shouted “To Arms! To Arms!” in response to Patrick Henry’s famous line, 
“Give me liberty, or give me death!”  The author of this article was reminded of the unwavering belief in 
liberty of many of the Founders while in a weekend Revolutionary War re-enactment with his then ten-
year-old son at a school outing at Riley’s Farm in Oak Glen, California.  The family patriarch delivered 
Henry’s speech.  Visit Riley’s Farm online at www.rileysfarm.com. 
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radical as I think people tried to characterize the Warren Court, it 
wasn’t that radical.  It didn’t break free from the essential 
constraints that were placed by the founding fathers in the 
Constitution, at least as it’s been interpreted, and [the] Warren 
Court interpreted in the same way that, generally, the 
Constitution is a charter of negative liberties, says what the states 
can’t do to you, says what the federal government can’t do to 
you, but it doesn’t say what the federal government or the state 
government must do on your behalf.  And that hasn’t shifted.114 
 
Justice Elena Kagan, one of President Barack Obama’s appointments to 
the Supreme Court, wrote perhaps more directly than President Obama, as a 
Supreme Court law clerk for Justice Thurgood Marshall in 1987 on the 
theories of negative and positive constitutionalism: “I only worry that a 
majority of this court will agree with [Seventh Circuit] Judge Posner and that 
‘the Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties’ and 
will thereby preclude the approach of the Third and Fourth circuits.”115 
Justice Kagan wrote her memo to Justice Marshall in DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County,116 a case that may be an example of the old legal saying 
that hard cases make bad law.  In that case: 
 
The court’s 6-3 ruling immunized state welfare officials who 
over the course of a year failed to act when repeatedly alerted to 
an alcoholic father’s violent abuse of his four-year-old son.  The 
continued beatings ultimately put the boy in a coma, destroyed 
half his brain and left him institutionalized for life, court records 
say.117 
 
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit had held that state officials had 
no duty to protect the son, Joshua DeShaney, and U.S. Supreme Court Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the majority, said the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended “to protect the people 
from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each 
other.”118   
                                                 
 114. Jake Tapper, McCain to Attack Obama for Public Radio Comments from 2001, ABC NEWS (Oct. 
27, 2008, 10:16 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2008/10/McCain-to-attac/.  
 115. Jess Bravin, Kagan Backed Broad Interpretation of 14th Amendment, WALL ST. J. (May 16, 2010, 
9:44 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703745904575248620872377444.html.  
 116. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 117. Bravin, supra note 115. 
 118. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196. 
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A recent Wall Street Journal article reporting on DeShaney and Kagan, 
however, has cited a discussion of legal scholars concerning the revitalization 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: 
 
Some liberals have argued that it would be wiser to ground 
claims like DeShaney’s in another 14th Amendment clause, 
which bars states from abridging “the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States.”  Since the late 19th century, the 
Supreme Court has given little significance to the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause.  But scholars across the political spectrum 
believe that reading is mistaken, and say its diminished status 
has resulted in limiting rights the framers intended citizens to 
exercise.119 
 
The article further quotes David Gans of the liberal Constitution 
Accountability Center as stating that the “right of protection” that the court 
rejected in DeShaney was “unquestionably one of the Privileges or 
Immunities that the framers of the [Fourteenth] Amendment considered a 
fundamental right of all citizens.”120  Professor Randy Barnett, presumably 
on the end of the political spectrum opposite Gans, would likely also argue 
for using the Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect liberty.121 
Thus, the DeShaney case has legal scholars, probably at the outer edges 
of each end of the political spectrum, reaching for protection of the plaintiff 
but in potentially different ways, unless the two sides converge on the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause.  Certainly, President Obama’s criticism of 
reading the U.S. Constitution as a charter of negative liberties is likely far 
removed from the views of James Madison, Justice Scalia, Justice Goldberg, 
and Professor Barnett concerning the federal government as a government of 
enumerated powers.122  Even a positive constitutionalist like Sotirios A. 
Barber, in a response to Randy E. Barnett, has identified James Madison as 
likely espousing negative constitutionalism.123  Presumably, President 
Obama’s constitutional view would be closer to Justice Kagan’s.  
Given that President Obama gave the nation the individual mandate 
through medical legislation dubbed “Obamacare,” it might be instructive to 
inquire into his own constitutional theories that might underlie such 
legislation.  In fact, President Obama had spent twelve years at the 
University of Chicago Law School as a lecturer teaching three classes in 
constitutional law which included due process and equal protection, voting 
                                                 
 119. Bravin, supra note 115. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 122. See supra notes 64–80 and accompanying text. 
 123. Sotirios A. Barber, Fallacies of Negative Constitutionalism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 651, 666 (2006).  
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rights, and racism and the law.124  But, as has been observed of President 
Obama, “his views [could not] be gleaned from scholarship; Mr. Obama has 
never published any.”125  On the other hand, President Obama did use a 
fellowship that the same law school gave him to write Dreams from My 
Father.126  Again, perhaps, examination of that record might help to 
illuminate President Obama’s constitutional theories and explain the 
country’s journey to the point where defense of liberties seems to have 
become more and more difficult. 
Dinesh D’Souza127 has apparently attempted just that task in recent 
Forbes Magazine article How Obama Thinks,128 a feature film called 2016: 
Obama’s America,129 and a book titled The Roots of Obama’s Rage.130  
Although Mr. D’Souza, an academic, has reached out to and through the 
popular media, his may be one of the only attempts to date to understand the 
political, and thus constitutional, philosophy that President Obama 
apparently received from his father.  
Mr. D’Souza’s thesis is that President Obama’s worldview is one that is 
foreign to most Americans.131  “To most Americans,” he states, “anti-
colonialism is an unfamiliar idea, so let me explain it.”132  Both Justice Scalia 
dissenting in NFIB and a Wall Street Journal article commenting on that case 
utilized the often cited American historical narrative framework that this 
country was born out of an anti-tax revolution.133  Justice Scalia wrote: 
 
Taxes have never been popular, see, e.g., Stamp Act of 1765, 
and in part for that reason, the Constitution requires tax increases 
to originate in the House of Representatives . . . .  We have no 
doubt that Congress knew precisely what it was doing when it 
                                                 
 124. Jodi Kantor, Teaching Law, Testing Ideas, Obama Stood Slightly Apart, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2008, 
at A1. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Dinesh D’Souza is President of King’s College and a Fellow at times at the Hoover Institute at 
Stanford University and the American Enterprise Institute. 
 128. Dinesh D’Souza, How Obama Thinks, FORBES MAG. (Sept. 9, 2010, 5:40 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0927/politics-socialism-capitalism-private-enterprises-obama-
business-problem.html [hereinafter How Obama Thinks]. 
 129. 2016:  OBAMA’S AMERICA (OAF LLC 2012). 
 130. DINESH D’SOUZA, THE ROOTS OF OBAMA’S RAGE (2010). 
 131. How Obama Thinks, supra note 128.   
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Anticolonialism was the rallying cry of Third World politics for much of the second half of the 20th 
century.”  Id. 
 133. See Joe Rago, A Vast New Taxing Power, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2012, 8:12 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303561504577496603068605864.html [hereinafter Vast 
New Taxing Power]. 
212 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 11, No. 2 
rejected an earlier version of this legislation that imposed a tax 
instead of a requirement-with-penalty . . . .  Imposing a tax 
through judicial legislation inverts the constitutional scheme, and 
places the power to tax in the branch of government least 
accountable to the citizenry.134   
 
Similarly, the Wall Street Journal, commenting upon the opinion, wrote as 
follows: 
 
America has its origins in a rebellion against arbitrary and 
pernicious taxation and the Framers wanted to make it extremely 
difficult to impose or raise direct taxes.  These can easily morph 
into plenary police powers, the regulation of private behavior 
and conduct that the Constitution vests in the states.  For this 
reason, while the taxing power in addition to raising revenue can 
achieve regulatory results, those regulatory results must be 
constitutional themselves.135  
 
Apparently, Mr. D’Souza believes that President Obama’s formative 
experience regarding governmental power was quite different.  Mr. D’Souza 
points out that President Obama spent his first seventeen years off the 
American mainland, in Hawaii, Indonesia, and Pakistan (with visits to 
Africa), that he has denied that he believes in American exceptionalism, and 
that he wrote the aforementioned book, Dreams from My Father.136  
Of President Obama’s father, Barack Obama, Sr., Mr. D’Souza writes: 
 
He was a Luo tribesman who grew up in Kenya and studied at 
Harvard.  He was a polygamist . . . .  He was also a regular drunk 
driver . . . causing his own legs to be amputated due to 
injury . . . .  In 1982 he got drunk at a bar in Nairobi and drove 
into a tree, killing himself.137 
 
However, Mr. D’Souza also says, “Obama Sr. was an economist, and in 
1965 he published an important article in the East Africa Journal called 
‘Problems Facing Our Socialism.’”138  Mr. D’Souza explains, “Obama Sr. 
wasn’t a doctrinaire socialist; rather, he saw state appropriation of wealth as a 
                                                 
 134. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2655 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 135. Vast New Taxing Power, supra note 133.  
 136. How Obama Thinks, supra note 128 (information derived from BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM 
MY FATHER: A STORY OF RACE AND INHERITANCE (2d ed. 2004)). 
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necessary means to achieve the anticolonial objective of taking resources 
away from the foreign looters and restoring them to the people of Africa.”139  
On taxes, the subject of this paper, Mr. D’Souza wrote the following of 
President Obama’s father: 
 
The senior Obama proposed that the state confiscate private land 
and raise taxes with no upper limit.  In fact, he insisted that 
“theoretically, there is nothing that can stop the government from 
taxing 100% of income so long as the people get benefits from 
the government commensurate with their income which is 
taxed.”140  
 
Mr. D’Souza continues in his analysis of Mr. Obama’s political and 
cultural background: 
 
Today’s neocolonial leader is not Europe but America.  As the 
late Palestinian scholar Edward Said—who was one of Obama’s 
teachers at Columbia University—wrote in Culture and 
Imperialism, “The United States has replaced the earlier great 
empires and is the dominant outside force.” 
  
. . . .  
 
It may seem incredible to suggest that the anticolonial ideology 
of Barack Obama Sr. is espoused by his son, the President of the 
United States. 
 
. . . .  
 
Colonialism today is a dead issue.  No one cares about it except 
the man in the White House.  He is the last anticolonial.  
Emerging market economies such as China, India, Chile and 
Indonesia have solved the problem of backwardness . . . . 
. . . [O]ur President is trapped in his father’s time machine . . . . 
The invisible father provides inspiration and the son dutifully 
gets the job done.  America today is governed by a ghost.141  
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Even allowing for some political hyperbole in Mr. D’Souza’s 
assessment, he does offer several examples of the President’s “anticolonial 
ideology.”  Specifically, Mr. D’Souza cites the President’s: (1) support for 
oil drilling off the coast of Brazil but not in America; (2) reduction of 
America’s carbon consumption; subsidizing energy production in the 
developing world; (3) refusal to nationalize investment banks and the health 
sector but instead bringing them under the government’s leash (primarily by 
refusing bail out paybacks to financial institutions and by imposing 
Obamacare); (4) having the rich pay close to fifty percent or more of their 
income in overall taxes; (5) failing to object to Britain’s release of Lockerbie 
bomber Abdel Baset al-Megrahi to his home country; and (6) NASA’s role 
as a public relations program outreach to Muslim countries.142  Of all the 
analysis, Mr. D’Souza’s observations about President Obama’s relation to the 
health industry may be most informative and apropos to this analysis: 
 
For Obama, health insurance companies on their own are 
oppressive racketeers, but once they submitted to federal 
oversight he was happy to do business with them.  He even 
promised them expanded business as a result of his law forcing 
every American to buy health insurance.143   
 
This statement may well explain the President’s political outlook on the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate.  Mr. D’Souza’s explanation of 
President Obama as an antineocolonialist appears to be in accord with the 
President’s own criticism of the constitution as a charter of negative liberties.  
Certainly, a neocolonialist view would appear more in accord with the 





Whether or not Mr. D’Souza is correct about the source of President 
Obama’s outlook on constitutional government in the United States, it seems 
clear that the view of President Obama, his former solicitor general, and now 
Supreme Court appointee, Elena Kagan, is quite different from that of James 
Madison, Justice Scalia, Justice Goldberg, academicians like Professor 
Barnett, and even the Warren Court.  Sadly to this author and likely to the 
traditional American narrative, though, this view may not be so different 
from that of the American people.  Presently, the re-election of President 
Obama continues the implementation of the individual mandate and may 
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signify that a majority of the American people, at least in some states and 
cities, prefer the offer of security to liberty.  Founding father Benjamin 
Franklin has been credited with the quote, “They who can give up essential 
liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor 
safety.”144  Similarly, to paraphrase former British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, described as a “soul mate” of President Ronald Reagan145 and 
credited with musings that socialism is great until you run out of other 
people’s money,146 the end of the United States could well be when we run 
out of liberty. Some have likely said of President Reagan that his mantra was 
lower taxes, less government, more personal freedom.147  Recent 
constitutional tax cases such as NFIB and events like the re-election of 
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President Obama certainly depart from Reagan’s formula.  To value liberty, 
likely a different course must be taken from the present one.148 
                                                 
 148. President Reagan gave hope to the then-younger generation—the “Baby Boomers”—that they 
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malaise-u-gotten-little-soft-135010839.html (comparing a controversial Obama speech with Carter’s 
“malaise speech”).  For example, among his many quotable phrases, Reagan spoke of America as the 
“shining city on the hill” and his re-election slogan was “It’s Morning Again in America.”  See Ronald 
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